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Article 3

COMMENTS
THE CUSTODY OF CHILDREN
Masculine supremacy (especially if the male be married) has
until very recently been enforced by the common law courts
with a zeal worthy of a better cause. Such purely legal supremacy has probably lasted longer than it has been reflected by
actual facts. Legally, however, as well as practically, it has
gradually receded until there are now but few residua of the
proud position once held by the male of the species.
The right to the custody of children has reflected this same
development. Such cases as Ex parte Skinner' and King vs.
Greenhill,2 in both of which a father was held to be entitled to
the custody of his small children as against their mother notwithstanding the fact that she had separated from him on
account of his admitted and continuing misconduct, are now
looked upon as antiquities of the law-and not very honorable
antiquities at that. Statutes 3 and also contrary decisions of
Courts of Equity4 have effectively disposed of the doctrine of
these cases in England.
In America the history of the development of this subject has
been somewhat similar to that in England but it is comforting
that in most jurisdictions no statutes have been necessary in
order to reach the same result. Very early, American courts
began to recognize that the question is not one of rights of parents or others to custody but rather of the right of the child,
itself, and of the state to have its custody placed where it will
be most conducive to its welfare. 5 In other words, while it
is generally fitting and proper that the parents should have the
custody of the child, this is only true because, and to the extent
that, it will be conducive to the child's welfare; and accordingly
19 Moore, 278 (1824).
24
Ad. & El. 624 (1836).
See the acrimonious (but it is submitted
justifiably so) comment on this case by Walworth, Chancellor, in AMfercein
v. People, 25 Wend. 64, at pp. 93-94.
8 2 & 3 Vict. c. 54 (Talfourd's Act) giving the mother a right to the
custody of infants under the age of 7; 36 & 37 Vict. c. 12 (Infant's Custody Act) extending this right to children under 16.
4 See Tiffany on Domestic Relations (3rd Edition), p. 344.
5 There is a valuable general discussion of this subject in Tiffany on
Domestic Relations (3rd Edition), pp. 343-354. Among the leading cases
are Aercein v. People, supra; Wood v. Wood, 77 N. J. Eq. 593, 77 Atl. 91;
McKim v. MeKim, 12 R. I. 462, where the custody of a four-year-old girl
was awarded to the mother, although the latter was apparently largely to
blame for her separation from the father, the court basing its action upon

"the welfare of the child, considering her tender age, her sex, and the
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the custody may properly be taken away from either or both
parents if the welfare of the child demands such action. 6
The rule indicated above is now followed in nearly all American jurisdictions, though there is perhaps not entire uniformity
in its application. As already indicated, the parents are prima
facie entitled to the custody of children-not because of the
parent's rights but because this is ordinarily conducive to the
child's welfare-and the father has perhaps a slight advantage
over the mother. To follow the phraseology of a race, the
father has a very slight handicap over the mother but both
parents have a very decided handicap over any other claimant
to the custody of the child. This does not mean, however, that
any of the persons thus entitled to a handicap are sure to win
the race. It takes but a very little for the mother to overcome
the father's handicap and while it is much more difficult, it is
by no means impossible for a third person to win over either or
both of the parents.
To abandon this comparison and to make use of the ordinary
legal phraseology, the father will be preferred over the mother
if all other things are equal and either parent will be even more
clearly preferred over a third person, unless, the third person
is better fitted for the custody of the child; but in all cases the
test is not the "rights" of the persons claiming custody but the
welfare of the child.
Such welfare is of course primarily a question of fact and of
judgment. The following circumstances are among the more
important which have been considered by the courts in the
application of this test, these elements being here mentioned
roughly in order of their importance. They are as follows:
(1) Moral character of the persons seeking custody;7 (2)
Temperamental characteristics of such persons including
especially their aptitude in the governing and general handling
delicacy of her constitution." See also the statement of Justice Story in
U. S. v. Green, 3 Mason 482 (Fed. Cas. No. 15256): "It is an entire mistake to suppose the court is at all events bound to deliver over the infant
to his father, or that the latter has an absolute vested right in the custody."
6 Wood v. Wood, supra; McDonald v. Short, 190 Ind. 338, 130 N. E. 536.
7 Kelsey v. Green, 69 Conn. 291, 37 Atl. 679; Young v. State, 15 Ind.
480; Gamer v. Gordon, 41 Ind. 92. In Commonwealth v. Addicks, 5 Binn.

(Pa.) 520, two little girls were awarded to their mother as against their
father, although the mother had been divorced from the father on account
of her misconduct and was then living, as his wife, with the man with
whom she had had improper relations and whom she had been forbidden
to marry. However, a few years later, the same children were awarded to
the father, the court considering that the older child would be put in
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of children, with firmness but without undue severity ;8 (3) The
age of the child ;9 (4) The sex of the child;1O (5)

The general

health of the child;" (6) The relative pecuniary ability of the
persons seeking custody ;12 (7) The wishes of the child as to his4
own custody;13 (8) The parent's agreements as to custody.'
With respect to these elements, in numbers (3), (4), and (5)
the mother or other female relative is of course preferred in
the case of small children, especially if they are in delicate health,
and she is also preferred in the case of a girl; as to the other
serious moral peril by being left with the mother. (2 S. & R. 194.) In
Joab v. Sheets, 99 Ind. 328, it was held that the intent of the mother to
disobey an order of court forbidding her to take the child out of the state
did not show her moral unfitness.
s lercein v. People, supra, where the father was barred in part because
of his rough and boisterous disposition; Jones v. Darnall, 103 Ind. 564,
2 N. E. 229.
9 McKim v. McKim, supra; Commonwealth v. Addicks, supra. A rather
extreme application of this test was made in People v. Sinclair, 91 App.
Div. 322, 86 N. Y. Supp. 539, where a three-year-old boy was, on account
of his tender age, awarded to his mother as against his father. Only two
years later, the boy, now arrived at the manly age of five, was again
claimed by his father, and the court decided that the father was now
entitled to the custody. 40 Misc. 230, 95 N. Y. Supp. 861, affirmed 105
App. Div. 642, 94 N. Y. Supp. 1154.
lo McKim v. McKim, supra; Hussey v. Whiting, 145 Ind. 580, 44 N. E.
639.
11 McKim v. McKim, supra; Reeves v. Reeves, 75 Ind. 342.
12 Wood v. Wood, supra; Shaw v. Nachtwey, 43 Ia. 653. Of course
"welfare" does not mean solely pecuniary welfare (Stapleton v. Poynter,
111 Ky. 264, 62 S. W. 730), but pecuniary resources are an important constituent element of welfare.
I3 Kelsey v. Green, supra; Darnell v. Mullikin, 8 Ind. 152. In Stapleton
v. Poynster, supra, the court intimated an opinion that the child's wishes
are of little weight in this matter, because of its immaturity. It is submitted that this reasoning is unsound, because the happiness of the child is
a vital factor in its general welfare, and on this point its maturity or
immaturity are not really of consequence. In Wood v. Wood, supra, and
Shaw v. Nachtwey, supra, the court declined to follow the child's expressed
wishes, but only on the ground that the expression was believed not to represent the child's real feelings, because of undue influence on the part
of persons then having custody. To this extent a consideration of the
immaturity of the child is perhaps justified. It is believed, however, that
the courts have, in general, given too little weight to this factor in its
welfare.
14 All courts give little weight to this point and properly so, since it has
no direct bearing on the child's welfare. Many states (probably including
Indiana) do not even give effect to it as a renunciation of the so-called
rights of the parent to custody. See Kales, Cases on Persons, Note on p. lo;
Brooke v. Logan, 112 Ind. 183, 13 N. E. 669.
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elements the claimant who is preferred is sufficiently obvious
from the very statement of the test.
The same tests are applicable in any case where the custody
of child is under consideration, whether in divorce or separation proceedings, in habeas corpus proceedings, or any other
cases where the custody of children comes before the courts.
Of course in divorce proceedings the contest is usually only
between the two parents, but even in such cases the child may
be awarded to a third person not a party to the proceedings,
if its welfare so demands. 15
Indiana has an unusually consistent and honorable record
with respect to this matter. A few of the earlier decisions' 6
may seem to take a somewhat rigid position with respect to the
so-called "rights" of the father or the mother; but even these
cases recognize the necessity of the consideration of the welfare
of the child. More recent cases in this state have, however,
abandoned any consideration other than the child's welfare and
have awarded the custody solely with reference to this test.17
The priority of the parents has been properly considered not as
a question of their rights but as merely an application of the
same test of the child's welfare; that is to say that, as a matter
of fact, it will ordinarily be conducive to that end that the child
15 See McDonald v. Short, supra, where in divorce proceedings the custody of the child had been awarded to a third person, although both parents were living; the court held that this was presumptive evidence of the
unfitness of the parents. See also Dinson v. Drosta, 39 Ind. App. 432.
10 Tarkington v. State, 1 Ind. 171; Bounell v. Berryhill, 2 Ind. 613;
State v. Banks, 25 Ind. 495; Henson v. Watts, 40 Ind. 170; Child v. Dodd,
51 Ind. 484.
17 The leading case is undoubtedly Hussey v. Whiting, supra, where the
custody of a thirteen-year-old girl in delicate health was awarded to her
maternal grandparents as against her father, although the latter was concededly of good moral character, partly because the child preferred to stay
with her grandparents but more largely because she was in delicate health
and her grandparents had greater financial and other resources for taking
care of her. See also Berkshire v. Caley, 157 Ind. 1, 60 N. E. 696, and
Corn v. Hollon, 191 Ind. 248, 132 N. E. 587, which are recent cases reaching similar results, the latter referring especially to relative pecuniary
resources as bearing on the ability to educate the child.
In Shoaf v. Livengood, 172 Ind. 707, 88 N. E. 598, it was held that the
guardian has no absolute right to the custody of his minor ward althougif
the statutes of Indiana relating to the appointment of guardians (Burns'
Annotated Statutes, 1926, Sees. 3388 & 3389) give a preference to parents
very similar to that given them as to custody of children.
The following miscellaneous cases are of interest on the general subject:
MaGlennan v. Margowski, 90 Ind. 150; Bryan v. Lyon, 104 Ind. 227, 3 N. E.
880; Schleuter v. Canatsy, 148 Ind. 384, 47 N. E. 825; Gilmore v. Kitson,
165 Ind. 402, 74 N. E. 1083; Orr v. State, 70 Ind. App. 242, 123 N. E. 470.
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be left with one of its parents, unless the parent is quite clearly
unfit to have such custody.
The question is therefore one of fact and an upper court on
appeal should not reverse the decision of the lower court unless
the circumstances are such that a reversal on the facts is
justified. In other words, there is a very strong presumption of
the correctness of the findings of the lower court even though
the custody be awarded to be in favor of claimants other than
the parents of the child. Accordingly an upper court should
not reverse except under extraordinary circumstances. The
Indiana Supreme Court has several times so held, in one or
two cases stating that a contrary decision by the lower court
would likewise have been upheld.1 8 In these cases, the court
considered that the situation was such as to justify the affirmance of any decision by the lower court.
These principles have been recently applied by the Indiana
Supreme Court in Mesmer vs. Egland, 151 N. E. 826, a case
which on first reading seems somewhat startling. The question
in this case was of the custody of a girl, nine years old. Her
father being dead, the custody was claimed by her mother as
against her great-grandmother. The child had lived with the
latter claimant during nearly all her life and was greatly
attached to her. Both of the parties to the action were concededly of good character but the pecuniary resources of the
great-grandmother considerably exceeded those of the mother,
though the latter would have presumably have been able to support the child. Under these circumstances the lower court
awarded the custody of the child to the great-grandmother and
upon the mother's appeal the decision was affirmed. The decision of the Supreme Court was based primarily upon the
theory that the circumstances were not sufficiently clear in favor
of the mother to warrant the court in reversing the decision of
the lower court.
The result of the case may seem to impose a serious hardship
upon the mother but it must be remembered that in all such
cases the question is not the "rights" of the person claiming
custody, for there are no such rights; the question is rather
the welfare of the child. When, as here, the child had lived
nearly all her life with the defendant, her great-grandmother,
who was obviously fitted by character and temperament for her
lSAicKenzie v. State, 80 Ind. 547; Bullock v. Robertson, 160 Ind. 521,
65 N. E. 5; Mahan v. Hendricks, 181 Ind. 630, 99 N. E. 418; Luellen v.
Younger, 194 Ind. 411, 143 N. E. 163; Keesling v. Keesling, 42 Ind. App.
361, 85 N. E. 837.
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custody; when the child very evidently preferred to stay with
the defendant; and when the pecuniary resources of the defendant clearly exceeded that of the mother (although this is of
course a matter of somewhat less consequence), the circumstances are certainly sufficient to justify the affirmance of the
decision of the lower court. It submitted, therefore, that the
result, while perhaps surprising, is justified; and, at any rate
that the general attitude of the court that the welfare of the
child is controlling and that such welfare is largely a question
of fact as to which the decision of the lower court is entitled
to great weight, is clearly correct and praiseworthy. The court
has laid down principles which are not merely sound from the
standpoint of legal theory but also from a practical standpoint.
Such a decision ought to insure that the question of the custody
of Indiana children who are in the future brought before the
courts of the state, shall be determined in accordance with
sound principles and therefore, in most cases at least, for the
best interests of the child and of the community.
ROBERT C. BROWN,

Indiana University School of Law.

